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Contingency-theorists have put forth differing accounts of evolutionary contingency. The bulk of these 
accounts abstractly refer to certain causal structures in which an evolutionarily contingent outcome is 
supposedly embedded. For example, an outcome is evolutionarily contingent if it is at the end of a ‘path-
dependent’ or ‘causally dependent’ causal chain. However, this paper argues that many of these 
proposals fail to include a desideratum – the notion of biological evitability or that evolutionary 
outcomes could have been otherwise – that for good theoretical reasons ought to be part of an account 
of evolutionary contingency. Although an inclusion of this desideratum might seem obvious enough, 
under some existing accounts, an outcome can be contingent yet inevitable all the same. In my diagnosis 
of this issue, I develop the idea of trajectory propensity to highlight the fact that there are plausible 
biological scenarios in which causal structures, alone, fail to exhaustively determine the biological 
evitability of evolutionary forms. In the second half of the paper, I present two additional desiderata of 
an account of evolutionary contingency and, subsequently, proffer a novel account of evolutionary 
contingency as non-trivial objective probability which overcomes the shortcomings of some previous 
proposals. According to this outcome-based account, contingency claims are probabilistic statements 
about an evolutionary outcome’s objective probability of evolution within a specifically defined modal 
range: an outcome, O, is evolutionarily contingent in modal range, R, to the degree of objective 
probability, P (where P is in between 1 and 0). 
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Evolutionary Contingency as Non-Trivial Objective Probability: 
Biological Evitability and Evolutionary Trajectories 
 
Highlights 
• There is no present consensus as to what evolutionary contingency amounts to. This paper’s 
chief concern is the proper characterisation of evolutionary contingency. 
• A number of recent proposals of contingency are inadequate in various respects. Most 
concerning is that, contrary to good theory, some of these accounts permit an outcome to 
be evolutionarily contingent yet inevitable, all the same (under certain demonstrable 
conditions). 
• The paper develops a dynamical systems analysis to highlight two forms of modalities that 
have been implicit in past discussions of evolutionary contingency. Whilst counterfactual 
robustness has received much attention, many previous proposals of contingency overlook 
the form of modality that I call trajectory propensity, which makes explicit the fact that 
evolutionary outcomes are often preceded by a series of antecedents that, themselves, have 
a dlow objective probability of occurrence. 
• Alongside a presentation of some desiderata of an account of contingency, the paper puts 
forth a novel account of evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability that 
overcomes the shortcomings of some previous proposals. According to this account, an 
outcome, O, is evolutionarily contingent in modal range, R, to the degree of objective 
probability, P (where P is in between 1 and 0). 
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Evolutionary Contingency as Non-Trivial Objective Probability:  
Biological Evitability and Evolutionary Trajectories 
 
1. Introduction 
Almost all textbooks in evolutionary biology, nowadays, seem to banally commend the diversity 
and/or disparity of biological forms found in the natural world. These textbooks allude to the myriad 
of clever solutions to ecological problems and revel in the supposed power of evolution to conjure 
up forms that anthropocentrically seem impressive to us. But considering all of this remarkability, 
how much of it was inevitable in its evolution? Or were they, human forms included, merely 
historical accidents? These questions, I take it, are at the heart of the idea of evolutionary 
contingency. 
Although this might seem obvious enough, of the various senses of evolutionary contingency 
proposed in the literature, most characterisations (save three) fail to entail the possibility of 
alternative outcomes. In fact, under some accounts of evolutionary contingency, an outcome can be 
evolutionarily contingent yet inevitable, all the same. This is significant for such a result does not gel 
well with our intuitions nor, as we shall see, with good theory – it indicates that there is something 
amiss with these accounts. 
Contingency-theorists have presented a wide range of different and, sometimes, competing 
accounts of evolutionary contingency. They abstractly refer to a variety of etiological structures with 
a particular set of causal conditions (e.g. ‘causal dependence’, ‘path dependence’, ‘sensitivity to 
initial conditions’), in which evolutionarily contingent outcomes are supposedly embedded. For 
example, an outcome is taken to be evolutionarily contingent if it is an outcome at the end of a path 
dependent causal chain, or if it is an outcome that is sensitive to initial conditions. 
The objective of the present paper is to consider the candidacy of some recent proposals of 
contingency in light of three desiderata and, then, to proffer a novel account for consideration. As 
alluded to earlier, the most significant shortcoming of some previous proposals is that the causal 
conditions outlined by these accounts can fall short of entailing a special kind of modal profile – i.e. 
biological evitability – for evolutionary outcomes. However, the biological evitability of evolutionary 
outcomes, or that evolutionary outcomes could have been otherwise in the face of a set of 
nomologies and histories, is a desideratum of an account of evolutionary contingency since without 
such a feature, contingency claims are no longer what they are ordinarily taken to be. Moreover, 
without biological evitability, some of the processes putatively taken to account for evolutionary 
contingency (e.g. ‘fluctuating adaptive landscapes’, ‘global system changes’) are theoretically 
excluded. 
The failure of certain senses of contingency to entail the evitability of outcomes is owed to the fact 
that there has been a narrow focus on the etiological dynamics of (a set of) evolutionary trajectories 
within an evolutionary system (e.g. whether two or more causal chains with similar starting points 
lead to markedly different outcomes), and a consequent failure to recognise the distinct probability 
of remaining on a trajectory (what I shall later call ‘trajectory propensity’) within an evolutionary 
system. There are plausible biological scenarios where a high sensitivity to initial conditions, for 
example, is coupled with high trajectory propensity such that the evolutionary outcome was, after 
all, inevitable (or close to it). Ultimately, I conclude that evolutionary contingency ought to be sure 
to assert the right modal profile (i.e. biological evitability) for outcomes by being attuned to the 
possibility of high trajectory propensity rather than merely asserting certain etiological structures in 
which they are found. 
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However, in addition to biological evitability, there are other desiderata for an account of 
evolutionary contingency. In this paper, I identify and present two additional desiderata. For 
example, it was a central theme of Gould’s (1989, 2002) overarching project to emphasise the 
importance of history for evolutionary events, and contingency was (in a particular Gouldian way) to 
be the vessel by which that is true. Contingency-theorists have continued along this avenue of 
thought (e.g. Beatty and Desjardins, 2009; Beatty and Carrera, 2011; Desjardins, 2011a, 2011b, 
2016) though, as we shall see, there is not just one way in which history can be important. Another 
often-cited desideratum is that evolutionary contingency ought to be able to vary in degree (e.g. 
Beatty, 1995, 2006; Desjardins, 2011a; Turner, 2011a; Powell, 2012). By that, it is minimally meant 
that whatever contingency is, there ought to be a spectrum of views ranging from the extreme to 
the intermediate. However, the way in which contingency varies in degree is very much dependent 
on the sense of contingency invoked. In fact, it is even non-sensical under some accounts. The need 
for a concept that varies in degree is supported by the putative fact that various levels of 
contingency are seemingly exhibited across distinct evolutionary domains, and that a proper account 
of contingency ought to be able to track such heterogeneity. 
Alongside my presentation of the three desiderata1, I shall proffer an original account of 
evolutionary contingency. I submit that evolutionary contingency can be understood as asserting the 
non-trivial (not one or zero) objective probability of an evolutionary outcome within a specified range 
of evolutionary scenarios (modal range). Although such a solely probabilistic account differs from 
previous etiological and/or structural proposals of contingency, it is not out of place within 
evolutionary biology. After all, modern evolutionary theory is an inherently probabilistic enterprise 
in that it makes use of both subjective and objective probabilities in concepts such as fitness, 
selection coefficients, the law of segregation, and genetic drift. Contingency claims are no different 
and are merely assertations about the objective probability that certain outcomes evolve which, 
considering that they are under the purview of certain biological nomologies and histories, present 
as interesting scientific propositions. 
This paper is divided into two halves: a negative element, criticising existing senses of contingency, 
followed by a more constructive element proposing the novel account. The plan is as follows: I begin 
with a brief primer on Beatty’s (2006) two senses of evolutionary contingency. In section 2, I then 
unpack the idea of biological evitability and discuss its importance: it appears that previous usages of 
evolutionary contingency have implicitly subsumed the feature of biological evitability. This is no 
surprise as Gould, himself, consistently presented evolutionary contingency as if it implied 
alternative possibilities of evolutionary outcomes. After having motivated the thought that a 
theoretically sound notion of evolutionary contingency entails evitability, I argue that Beatty’s (2006) 
causal dependence sense of contingency fails to do so. In section 3, I formally develop the idea of 
trajectory propensity, in a dynamical systems analysis, in order to highlight two forms of modalities 
at play within evolutionary systems. With this new theoretical machinery, I demonstrate that other 
senses of evolutionary contingency such as sensitivity to initial conditions and a specific 
understanding of path dependence also fail to entail evitability. In the latter half, I identify two 
additional desiderata and offer a novel account of evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective 
probability that is able satisfy all three desiderata. However, Desjardins’ path dependence account 
                                                          
1 A brief note at this point: there can, in principle, be more than three desiderata for an account of 
evolutionary contingency (candidates include: empirical tractability, parsimony, and, (in)determinism 
neutrality). I present the three desiderata to evaluate the new account as a feasible alternative. See section 5 
for further discussion. 
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fares equally as well with respect to the desiderata and so, it is not clear that there is one superior 
account that ought to be understood as evolutionary contingency. Barring additional means for 
resolution, I advocate a sense of pluralism for evolutionary contingency. I conclude the paper by 
sketching some of the ways that contingency claims under the new account can be empirically 
evaluated. 
2. Evolutionary Contingency à la Beatty 
In Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (1989), Gould proposed a thought 
experiment that neatly captures the central idea behind evolutionary contingency2: 
I call this experiment “replaying life’s tape.” You press the rewind button and, making sure 
you thoroughly erase everything that actually happened, go back to any time and place in 
the past… Then let the tape run again and see if the repetition looks at all like the original. 
(Gould 1989, pg. 48) 
Gould’s expectation was that the outcome would be different from the original. However, he seems 
to speak of different versions of the tape of life. In some instances, Gould suggests replaying the 
tape of life from the same initial conditions:  
 We can explain an event after it occurs, but contingency precludes its repetition, even from 
an identical starting point (Gould, 1989, pg. 278)  
Replay the tape a million times from a Burgess beginning… (Gould, 1989, pg. 286)  
…I agree that the most fascinating aspects of life on earth is that it would probably play itself 
out in a totally different way if we started again from the same initial conditions (Letter from 
Gould to Schopf, 25 June 1979) 
But, elsewhere, Gould suggests replaying the tape of life from different initial conditions: 
Any replay, altered by an apparently insignificant jot or tittle at the outset, would have 
yielded an equally sensible and resolvable outcome of entirely different form (Gould, 1989, 
pg. 289) 
Alter any early event, ever so slightly and without apparent importance at the time, and 
evolution cascades into a radically different channel (Gould, 1989, pg. 51) 
It may be the case that Gould did not think that this amounted to any important difference and thus, 
glossed over the specificity of the point of rewind. However, Beatty (2006) recognises that the two 
versions of the tape of life metaphor amount to two importantly different senses of evolutionary 
contingency: that which he calls the ‘unpredictability sense’ and the ‘causal dependence sense’.  
Beatty’s (2006) unpredictability sense of evolutionary contingency asserts that different evolutionary 
outcomes could result from the same starting points or “initially indistinguishable ancestral 
environments” 3 (Ibid.). Even if the tape of life were replayed from the same initial conditions, 
                                                          
2 Whilst the tape of life metaphor is most popularly known from Wonderful Life (1989), Gould has been 
recently been accused (e.g. Baron, 2011; Erwin, 2016) of “borrowing” the metaphor from Conway Morris 
(1985). However, this is mistaken as Gould has been employing the metaphor prior to Conway Morris publicly 
in 1976 (i.e. Gould, 1976) and, furthermore, privately in a letter to Schopf (Gould, 1979). The tape of life 
faithfully originated with Gould. 
3 Turner (2011a) notes that the term ‘unpredictability’ is infelicitous for it might be inappropriately suggestive 
of an epistemic dimension. One ought to remember that, despite the ample use of epistemic terms in the 
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different outcomes could result. Put in another way, the initial conditions are causally insufficient to 
guarantee the same result. 
 
Figure 1. Unpredictability Sense: Ancestral state A could result in O or O’. 
Now, at first glance, this seems to be committed to indeterminism since it suggests that the same 
initial conditions could result in different outcomes whilst determinism asserts just that the state of 
the universe at any given time, along with the natural laws, uniquely determines the subsequent 
states of the universe (Earman, 1986)4. On this issue, Beatty (2006) denies that the unpredictability 
sense is tantamount to indeterminism by appealing to the possibility of divergences in the 
evolutionary path due to what he calls the ‘sources of contingency’ – phenomena like random 
mutation, mutational ordering, genetic drift, and more. These sources of contingency are supposed 
to lack counterfactual robustness as to occur differently upon replays of the tape of life such that 
you could very well have, for example, different mutations or drift outcomes upon each replay. So, 
although the initial conditions may be the same, ‘sources of contingency’ will direct evolution onto 
different trajectories, ultimately resulting in different outcomes5.  
The sense of contingency associated with the second version of the tape of life is what Beatty calls 
the ‘causal dependence’ sense. According to this sense, it is not that the same antecedent events 
lead to different outcomes (and hence, there is no longer a tension with determinism); rather 
outcomes are causally dependent, in an almost trivial way, on past events such that history is said to 
matter. The occurrence of certain antecedent events is, in Beatty’s (2006) words, “necessary” or 
“strongly necessary” for certain evolutionary outcomes. But, quite crucially, it is not just any type of 
necessity at play; more specifically, what Beatty is referring to is causal necessity (not metaphysical 
necessity). That is – if A is causally necessary for O, then O could not have occurred without A. This, 
alone, would be akin to simple causal necessity as it is ordinarily understood in the philosophical 
literature. 
                                                          
contingency literature (especially, Gould’s writings), evolutionary contingency is not about what epistemic 
agents can say about evolution, but about how evolution actually behaves lest evolutionary contingency 
devolve into something less interesting. 
4 This seems to present a two-horned dilemma: (i) either eschew determinism in favour of the unpredictability 
sense or, (ii) vice versa. However, I doubt that the former option will be readily adopted by biologists and 
philosophers given their pervasive fears of abandoning determinism (though Beatty, 2016, 2017 are 
exceptions). 
5 It is still somewhat of a mystery as to why these sources of contingency would not just yield the same results 
repeatedly. Due to lack of space, I cannot say any further about possible solutions to the indeterminism issue 
though see Millstein (2011) and List & Pivato (2015) for what, I think, could be developed into a ‘hidden 
variables’ or ‘coarse-graining function’ solution. For now, I must ‘black-box’ the (in)determinism issue. 
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But, charitably interpreted, there must be a subtle, additional element to Beatty’s causal 
dependence as it relates to evolutionary contingency. To this end, Beatty (2006) additionally states 
that: had the antecedent events not occurred or occurred differently, then the evolutionary 
outcome would not have occurred or would have occurred differently. Strictly speaking, the second 
element regarding ‘differential antecedents to differential outcomes’ does not logically follow from 
the simple causal necessity of an antecedent. Rather, support for this second element seems to stem 
entirely from the following passage in Wonderful Life: 
Historical explanations take the form of narrative: E, the phenomenon to be explained, arose 
because D came before, preceded by C, B, and A. If any of these earlier stages had not 
occurred, or had transpired in a different way, then E would not exist (or would be present 
in a substantially altered form, E, requiring a different explanation). I am not speaking of 
randomness... but of the central principle of all history – contingency (Gould, 1989, pg. 283) 
Thus, Beatty (2006) reasons that if evolutionary outcomes are ‘causally dependent’ on the past, then 
replaying the tape of life from even slightly different antecedent conditions would result in different 
outcomes. Once the second element is incorporated, Beatty’s causal dependence appears to be 
similar to ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ – a subtly different sense of contingency that we will soon 
encounter. Nonetheless, the second element is crucial, for it lends the causal dependence sense a 
historical element. Since any future outcome would be necessarily associated with a particular 
antecedent event, any future would be inscribed with the “inerasable signatures” (Gould, 1989, pg. 
283) of the past. For this reason, the causal dependence sense bodes well for Gould’s concomitant 
project of emphasising the importance of history (a desideratum that l will later discuss). But the 
replay experiment was meant to illustrate more than merely the importance of history; it was meant 
to also portray a shaky, uncertain future – or a possible difference in outcome. The problem, as I 
shall show in the subsequent section, is that the causal dependence sense, on its own, does not 
entail such a result. 
3. Biological Evitability: Evolutionary Forms Could Have Been Otherwise 
Consider the intuitive idea that contingent events are those that could have been otherwise. 
Borrowing some theoretical apparatus from standard metaphysics: if an event is contingent, then it 
occurs in the actual world, but there is at least one possible world in which the event does not occur. 
Conversely, if an event is necessary, then the event occurs in all possible worlds. Notice that this 
concept can be made to vary in degree: an event is more contingent just in case there are fewer 
possible worlds in which it occurs; or, if one prefers, an event is more contingent just in case some 
possible, non-actual, world where the event does not hold is closer (Lewis, 1973, 1986) to the actual 
world than any possible where the event does hold6. 
Similarly, one may wonder whether evolutionary outcomes could have been otherwise. Are the 
evolutionary outcomes we see today – from the birds and the bats to the worms that burrow in our 
earth – occurrences in all evolutionary environments (the appropriate container as opposed to 
                                                          
6 There are infinite possible worlds and so, there is a ‘counting’ problem. In lieu of counting, worlds can be 
ordered according to Lewis’s (1973, 1986) comparative similarity or closeness relation. But one can also ‘count’ 
the number of possible worlds (despite there being an infinite number of them) by some ‘external measure’ 
like a probability measure. Plausibly, Evitability Measure (Probability): A biological form A is evitable to the 
degree x iff the objective chance of the occurrence of biological form A is 1-x. The probability measure seems 
superior to a Lewisian closeness measure since it outputs degrees of evitability instead of contrast-classed 
propositions. All of this, however, is to foreshadow what is to come – i.e. the probabilistic account of 
contingency. 
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worlds) across some to be defined range of environments? Or is there at least one evolutionary 
environment (in the range) in which those species do not evolve (or evolve differently)?  
Biological Evitability: A biological form is evitable if and only if there is an evolutionary 
scenario in some range of environments (i.e. the modal range) in which it does not evolve. 
First and foremost, this is a biological notion rather than a metaphysical notion since evitability 
naturally depends on the biological laws of the range of evolutionary environments under 
consideration. If the relevant biological nomologies had been different, then the evitability of a form 
is likely to be different. But notice that under this definition, there has been no restriction on the 
extent of modality or the modal range at play (c.f. Wong, 2019). There ought to be some means of 
modal circumscription. I shall return to the idea of the modal range in section 5. 
As for biological evitability, unlike philosophical discussions in metaphysics about ‘contingent 
worlds’, there seems to exist a prevalent explanatory strategy inscribed in the evolutionary modern 
synthesis that would quite conveniently account for the inevitability (or close to inevitability) of 
biological outcomes across evolutionary environments. That is – at first glance, there seems to be 
biological reasons for thinking that the same outcomes would occur across all evolutionary 
environments for the engine of natural selection would push towards a very specific set of globally 
optimal forms7. In other words, insofar as there are a limited number of optimal forms and natural 
selection-cum-mutation is sufficient to result in optimal forms, then the same forms would evolve 
time and time again on account of their optimality. 
On the other hand, opponents of this kind of thinking (‘internalists’ like Gould) advocate the 
presence of chancy historical and/or phylogenetic constraints that limit the power of natural 
selection. They claim that due to the influence of historical events in circumscribing the ancestral 
genetic material, the right sort of variations required for the evolution of the globally optimal forms 
may not be available. As such, the globally optimal forms may not be repeatedly reached in all the 
evolutionary environments; whichever forms are reached, in an evolutionary scenario, is dependent 
on the history and phylogenetics of that evolutionary scenario8. 
It is within such dichotomous narratives (i.e. externalism vs. internalism) that contingency-theorists 
have frequently forged a link between the inevitability of forms and adaptationism (Beatty, 2006; 
Powell, 2012; Turner, 2011b). There is a putative connection between the biological inevitability of 
forms and adaptationism. If the inevitability of evolutionary outcomes is false, then it seems to say 
the following about the power of natural selection: natural selection has failed to push towards the 
same forms in phenotypic space. After all, if natural selection were truly all-powerful, then the 
globally optimal forms would be inevitable. However, the link between biological inevitability and 
adaptationism can be severed insofar as any one of many assumptions are false (inter alia): (i) there 
is a limited number of optimal forms (there are not multiple equally-as-adaptive solutions to the 
same selection problem), (ii) the power of natural selection includes the capacity to generate 
variations, (iii) the adaptive landscape (and hence, globally optimal forms) is counterfactually robust, 
                                                          
7 There are two major assumptions: the first assumption is that the globally optimal forms are universal across 
environments. The second assumption is that there are a limited number of optimal solutions to an 
ecological/selective problem (c.f. Wong, 2019) 
8 Constraints (internal or external) are like a double-edged sword. They can be invoked to explain the evitability 
of forms as in the Gouldian narrative by appealing to chancy antecedent events (e.g. phylogenetic events). 
However, they can also be invoked to support a non-contingent view of life: constraints (especially, functional 
ones imposed by the laws of nature) would set supposedly universal boundaries so tight that, time and time 
again, only certain forms would arise. 
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(iv) natural selection, itself, is not dependent on contingent events (see McConwell and Currie, 
2016). Nonetheless, the degree to which the biological (in)evitability of forms is informative for 
adaptationism is dependent on how likely these assumptions are true; in other words, the link is 
conditional. And, perhaps, depending on which assumptions fail, evitability can be telling of which 
flavour of adaptationism to adopt. 
The biological evitability of biological forms is also relevant to Gould’s discussion of the Burgess 
Shale. Wonderful Life (1989) argued that the re-interpretation of the Burgess Shale (by Whittington 
and his two graduate students which, ironically, included one of Gould’s opponents: Conway Morris) 
showed that there was greatest disparity during the Cambrian period. This disparity was exhibited by 
the plethora of ‘wonderful’ species, each with vastly different body plans. However, as Gould argues, 
the Cambrian was wrought by a series of lottery-like, fitness-insensitive mass extinctions whereby 
only a few survivors remained9. However, importantly, it was one of the surviving species – the 
Pikaia – that, then, became the ancestor to all modern vertebrates (according to Gould’s account). 
Gould’s crucial point was that it could have been any other species that survived rather than the 
Pikaia – perhaps, one containing a radically disparate body plan – and thus, downstream 
evolutionary history could have been very different. In Gould’s eyes, the (first10) reinterpretation of 
the Burgess Shale (along with his assumption of fitness-insensitive sampling) constituted evidence 
for the biological evitability of forms. Thus, if the Burgess Shale supports evolutionary contingency, 
then it is in virtue of its support for the biological evitability of forms. 
Even beyond evolutionary biology, biological evitability is of concern. For instance, the truth of 
biological evitability appears to be particularly pressing for Conway Morris’s theology (1998, 2003), 
for it seems to threaten the theistic significance of humans: after all, if evolutionary forms were 
evitable, then humans might not have evolved. How can theism be reconciled with the arbitrariness 
of humans as products of shaky historical accidents? Clearly, there is a lot riding – theologically 
speaking – on the biological evitability of forms. It is no surprise, then, that Conway Morris (2003) 
takes himself to be arguing for the biological inevitability of forms, as suggested by title of his book: 
“Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe” (emphasis added). But if a sense of biological evitability is 
not subsumed under evolutionary contingency, then has Conway Morris been arguing against a 
strawman? That is – if evolutionary contingency does not specify the biological evitability of human 
evolution (but merely pointed to the etiological dynamics of the causal chains that led up to human 
evolution), then humans can be deemed ‘evolutionarily contingent’ yet inevitable all the same. 
To strengthen the case even further from a different perspective: there was a commonality to both 
versions of Gould’s replay experiment. That is – both versions of Gould’s metaphor, regardless of 
whether there was an alteration in initial conditions, stipulated a difference in outcomes. This would 
explain why Gould seemed to nonchalantly slip between different versions of the tape of life 
metaphor: perhaps, it did not matter so much to Gould as to whether initial conditions are altered 
insofar as the outcome would (probably) turn out differently. 
Thus far, I have presented reasons for the importance of biological evitability in an account of 
evolutionary contingency: past discussions of contingency have implied biological evitability 
                                                          
9 Curiously, nowhere in Wonderful Life (1989) does Gould offer any explicit justification as to why the sampling 
of Cambrian species was fitness-insensitive. 
10 Owing to a transition from evolutionary systematics to cladistics, an adoption of quantitative morphological 
methods, and new discoveries in China and Greenland, it has been alleged that Wonderful Life was very much 
a product of its time in that the latest paleontological data paints a picture of the Cambrian as possessing less 
disparity than what Gould originally envisioned. 
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(including situating itself well within the Gouldian narrative11) and it allows for the contingency to be 
relevant with related debates. There is a third reason: after developing the idea of trajectory 
propensity in a dynamical systems framework, I shall argue that some biological processes, which 
account for the probability of initial conditions but not the etiological structures (e.g. causal 
dependence, sensitivity to initial conditions, etc.), are excluded unless evolutionary contingency 
satisfies the feature of biological evitability. For now, I return to Beatty’s (2006) causal dependence 
sense and argue that it fails to entail biological evitability. 
Despite its emphasising the importance of history, recall that the causal dependence sense, which 
Beatty (2006) interprets from Gould’s replay experiment, was also supposed to portray a difference 
in outcome: “[a]ny replay, altered by an apparently insignificant jot or tittle at the outset, would 
have yielded an … outcome of entirely different form” (Gould, 1989; emphasis added). But, drawing 
on a meticulous distinction between questions of causal sufficiency, causal necessity, and 
metaphysical necessity noted by Ben-Menahem (2009) in a parallel discussion in the philosophy of 
history, it is easy to see that Beatty’s sense of causal dependence, per se, is insufficient to entail the 
biological evitability of outcomes. Even if an antecedent was causally necessary for an outcome, it 
does not say anything about the modal status of the antecedent – that is, the degree to which it is 
necessary or contingent. Nor does it follow that the antecedent was causally sufficient for the 
outcome (to think so would be to commit the ‘converse fallacy’). 
The point is that just because an antecedent A is causally necessary for O, it does not follow that the 
antecedent A necessarily gives rise to O, nor that the antecedent will always occur, nor that the 
antecedent never occurs. Following standard philosophical tradition, the ‘causal sufficiency of the 
antecedent’, the ‘causal necessity of the antecedent’ and the ‘metaphysical necessity of the 
antecedents’ are all distinct notions. Accordingly, even if the causal dependence sense was true for 
an evolutionary form such that a specific antecedent was causally necessary for that form’s 
occurrence (e.g. the evolution of wings requires body plan X), the antecedent may be such that it 
always occurs. In this way, the causal dependence sense, per se, is insufficient to guarantee the 
biological evitability of outcomes. À la Ben-Menahem, we must not confuse causation with historical 
inevitability! The mistake is analogous to the common conflation of various properties about 
causality with fatalism in the metaphysical determinism literature. 
However, there is a way in which ‘causal dependence’ can lead to evitable outcomes, and it is to 
appeal to the chancy nature of a special class of historical events12. This is, in essence, the Gouldian 
strategy found in Wonderful Life. That is – contingency as causal dependence can be complemented 
with appeals to a special kind of historical events (Gould calls them ‘historical constraints’), which 
include some (but not all) sources of contingency. These historical events are supposedly quirky and 
metaphysically contingent, whereby plausible candidates include drift outcomes, mass extinctions, 
recombination outcomes, and mutational outcomes. So, even if an evolutionary outcome was 
causally dependent on an antecedent (in Beatty’s 2006 sense), insofar as the antecedent is chancy in 
its occurrence, there is some room for evitability. This strategy is akin to combining Beatty’s 
unpredictability sense (though, specifically, for the antecedent) and the causal dependence sense 
                                                          
11 This is, of course, only an exegetical reason for the importance of the feature of biological evitability. 
12 Interestingly, later in 2011, Beatty in a co-authored paper with Carrera comments on the inadequacy of 
causal dependence, alone, to capture the chanciness of evolutionary outcomes and suggests that causal 
dependence ought to be combined with a sense of ‘unpredictability’, but not the sense hitherto considered 
whereby the outcomes are ‘unpredictable’. Rather, Beatty suggests that it ought to be combined with a sense 
whereby the antecedents are ‘unpredictable’. 
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(Beatty, 2006). However, it remains that causal dependence, by itself, is simply uninformative about 
the evitability of biological forms. 
Put another way, the causal dependence sense, by itself, is somewhat trivial, for all it says is that 
outcomes are ‘causally dependent’ on the events that preceded them, such that: if the past had 
been different, then the future would also be different. Whilst it is true that some changes in initial 
conditions will produce some changes in outcome, it is not clear that there would be such changes in 
initial conditions at all: even if the future does depend on the past in the specific way that the causal 
dependence sense requires, on what basis would there be a chance in initial conditions? The moral 
of the story has been that there is no such basis: causal dependence does not necessarily entail 
evitable outcomes. Importantly, whether it is probable for the initial conditions to change at all is 
concerned with relevant facts about those initial conditions and can be formalised by the concept of 
trajectory propensity under a dynamical systems analysis. 
4. Two Forms of Modalities: Trajectory Propensity and Counterfactual Robustness 
Let us begin with a quotidian example involving train tracks to introduce the idea of trajectory 
propensity, and then consider a more sophisticated counterpart in dynamical systems, which affords 
additional complexity for modal analysis. At London St. Pancras station, there are a series of train 
tracks that lead to various destinations: Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, and so on. Each of these train 
tracks may exhibit certain properties. For instance, quite plausibly due to facts of geography, the 
track(s) to Paris may necessarily pass through Lille, and the track(s) to Amsterdam may necessarily 
pass through Antwerp. There is ’causal dependence’, so to speak. To reach Paris on a train, one must 
have passed through Lille. 
Moreover, a set of tracks may also exhibit properties (population-level property of tracks). For 
instance, even though all the tracks at St. Pancras are closely related in space to each other (they 
find themselves side by side inside the station, after all), they may reach destinations that are 
distantly related. In fact, we would take this to be an ordinary feature of any good train station lest it 
be of little use for international travel. But, because of this feature, a passenger who takes a few 
steps towards the wrong platform (and hence, boards the wrong train) could end up at a destination 
markedly distant from their intended destination. There is sensitivity to initial conditions, so to 
speak. 
However, it is easy to tell from this example that passengers do not so easily head towards the 
wrong platform, board the wrong train, or arrive at the wrong destination. Barring far-fetched 
Kafkaesque stories, passengers are ordinarily able to make their way to the right platform, trains 
function normally, and the tracks are reliable. After all, passengers listen to announcements and 
check reliable station signage, and regular maintenance is performed on the trains and the tracks. 
That is – there are good reasons why a passenger will tend to end up at their intended destination. 
Biology, I submit, is not too different. There may be good biological reasons for why certain 
evolutionary trajectories are highly probable regardless of whether those (set of) trajectories 
structurally exhibit causal dependence, sensitivity to initial conditions, or path dependence. 
4.1 The Dynamical Systems Analysis 
Progressing from the toy example, imagine an evolutionarily dynamical system whereby there are 
various trajectories, depicted by lines, leading continuously from point to point in phase space (see 
Figure 2). The dynamical system contains as many dimensions as needed to capture all the relevant 
aspects of the system, and, as such, phase points in the dynamical system exhaustively describe 
states of the system. What it means for a certain history to have obtained is just to be found in a 
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specific phase point of the system. Trajectories are a sequence of x0, x1, x2, …, xn, where x are phase 
points and x0 is the initiating phase point (or, colloquially, the ‘initial conditions’) of any particular 
trajectory. The shape and direction of trajectories (i.e. the topography) are determined by the 
relevant nomological laws pertinent to the system such that if natural selection, for example, had 
been one way rather than another, then trajectories may be one shape rather than another. 
 
Figure 2. Two-dimensional Cross-Section of an Evolutionarily Dynamical System13 
There is, indeed, some visual resemblance between evolutionary trajectories and train tracks from 
the bird’s eye view. But just as the probability of a passenger travelling on a specific track depends 
on the accuracy of station signage, reliability of train tracks, and much else, trajectories in an 
evolutionarily dynamical system are more or less probable depending on the features of the phase 
points of the trajectory. I will come to elaborate on these features shortly. 
But, for now, the dynamical systems framework is useful to illustrate two distinct forms of 
modalities that have been implicit in discussions of evolutionary contingency. On one hand, there is 
the matter of counterfactual robustness, which has been the primary object of attention in past 
discussions of evolutionary contingency. Roughly, some phase point (or trajectory14) is 
counterfactually robust if it obtains despite a variation in system conditions. That is – the extent to 
which an event is counterfactually robust is determined by its persistence in light of perturbations to 
(earlier) system conditions. On the other hand, there is something distinct; there is the probability of 
an evolutionary trajectory obtaining in an evolutionary system, which one may call trajectory 
propensity15. 
Trajectory Propensity is the probability of a trajectory obtaining within a system. It is equal 
to the product of the probability of all continuous phase points of the trajectory such that a 
                                                          
13 This particular system is continuous and non-ergodic. 
14 Trajectories can also be counterfactually robust when multiple trajectories converge into one (see Figure 2). 
15 I do not mean to imply that probabilities must be interpreted as propensities. 
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decrease of the probability of any phase point of the trajectory is accompanied by a 
decrease in the trajectory propensity (ceteris paribus)16. 
Relating this to the train example, it might be said that there is some counterfactual robustness in 
the ways that a passenger can make it to their intended destination. That is – if the original route is 
no longer functional, then, perhaps, another route can be taken to reach a passenger’s intended 
destination. It is this ‘multiple paths to the same destination’ that accounts for counterfactual 
robustness. However, it is the reliability of station signage, trains, and train tracks that pertain to 
trajectory propensity. Thus, it may be the case that, despite there being many paths to Paris, an 
alternative route need not ever be taken because the initial route was highly reliable. 
Likewise, there are two types of modalities at play for evolutionary systems: firstly, there is the 
matter of (i) trajectory propensity (i.e. how easily can system progressions remain on a trajectory, or 
switch to another) and, then, the (ii) counterfactual robustness of phase points or trajectories (i.e. 
the extent to which perturbations in system conditions fail to render a difference in the occurrence 
of phase points/trajectories). The second corresponds to the form of modality concerned when 
initial conditions are said to have been altered. However, when replaying the tape (whether it is the 
tape of St. Pancras or the tape of life), both forms of modality matter. 
In our dynamical systems analysis, counterfactual robustness is evident when a particular phase 
point can be reached by a number of different trajectories. Attractors, saddles, and other 
equilibrium points are paradigmatic examples of phase points that have high counterfactual 
robustness (see Figure 2)17. For example, if a different set of facts obtain such that phase point y1 
instead of phase point x1 obtains, but the same outcome occurs in either scenario, then the outcome 
is counterfactually robust. The extent to which it is counterfactually robust depends on the number 
of alternative trajectories by which it can be reached. 
In the past, the second type of modality (i.e. counterfactual robustness) has been famously alluded 
to in explicitly dynamical terms. Waddington (1939, 1940, 1957) proposed the idea of the epigenetic 
landscape (a developmental instance of our general evolutionary system) and spoke of 
‘canalization’. According to Waddington, there is canalization when the developmental nomologies 
of the system stipulate that there are different trajectories on the epigenetic landscape that, quite 
literally, ‘funnel’ into a specific point in phase space. Genetic canalization, then, is just a specific 
instance of how counterfactual robustness can be exhibited in such a dynamical systems framework. 
The distinction between the two forms of modalities highlights the fact that even if there is little 
counterfactual robustness, an evolutionary trajectory, on account of its high probability, can be quite 
certain to occur. In fact, there are biological scenarios where there are evolutionary trajectories that 
are highly probable to obtain regardless of whatever complex etiological structure they may be 
embedded in. 
To see this, recall that trajectory propensity (as per the definition above) is dependent on the 
probabilities of the individual phase points that make up the trajectory. In turn, the probabilities of 
                                                          
16 One way of interpreting probabilities in a dynamical systems analysis is to imagine a Gibbsian ensemble 
(1902), which refers to an infinite array of identical copies of the dynamical system, each of which are in a 
particular, unspecified system state. The probability of a phase point would, then, be akin to the probability of 
randomly picking out a system from this ensemble that is at the system state of being at that phase point. 
17 Sterelny’s (2005) concept of conditional inevitability would just be a case whereby all trajectories that pass 
through a condition will lead to a certain attractor. In other words, if the condition is satisfied, then that 
outcome will be reached. 
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individual phase points are dependent on the features of those phase points18. In other words, 
depending on the conditions that a phase point describes, it may be more or less probable than 
other phase points. So, for example, recent studies suggest that our four RNA nucleobases (i.e. 
Adenine, Uracil, Guanine, Cytosine) were likely to come about on account of formamide’s chemical 
tendency to produce specifically those four RNA bases (e.g. Ferus et al., 2015, 2017; Saladino et al., 
2001). At the same time, formamide was present in sizable amounts during Earth’s early history 
(Ibid.) Accordingly, in our dynamical systems analysis, phase points that contain in their descriptions 
our four RNA bases may be more probable than phase points that do not (ceteris paribus). If this is 
true, then trajectories that contain phase points with our four RNA bases have greater propensity 
than trajectories that contain phase points that do not (ceteris paribus). In general, an evolutionary 
trajectory composed of a sequence of highly probable phase points can be said to have high 
trajectory propensity – which, purely as a form of visual demonstration, can be illustrated by thicker 
lines in Figure 2. 
Consider a different biological example involving natural selection: take the phase point whose 
description of the system includes facts pertaining to the adaptive landscape (sensu Wright) in which 
a species is located. Some adaptive landscapes are more probable than others due to facts of the 
environment and the relevant nomological laws. This is, partly, owing to the fact that environments 
are often composed of other species (Lewontin, 1983) whose existence and behaviours may be 
quirky themselves. For example, in cases of Batesian or Mullerian mimicry whereby there is an 
evolution of apparently arbitrary colour patterns in order to mimic other species in the environment, 
whether a particular colour pattern is, indeed, an adaptive peak is dependent on the existence of 
other species and whatever patterns they may have. But, perhaps, certain species are unlikely to be 
found in that environment for ecological reasons, or that, due to certain facts about protein 
synthesis for pigmentation, some variations of colour patterns are less likely to come about. If this is 
so, then the specific colour patterns are not so arbitrary after all. The point is that, depending on 
features of a state of the system, the adaptive landscapes and their adaptive peaks specified by 
phase points may vary in their probability. In this case, it is not even certain where natural selection 
is aiming towards – the determination of which is amenable to probability. 
Recall that, earlier, I argued that causal dependence can come apart from biological evitability. This 
is now especially clear under the dynamical systems analysis. Much like the train example, certain 
etiological dynamics may be exhibited in an evolutionarily dynamical system19. Consider Figure 3, 
whereby causal dependence for O1 is exhibited since any trajectory that reaches O1 necessarily 
passes through A1 (but not vice versa). 
 
                                                          
18 Features of phase points also include time indices. Hence, evolutionary trajectories are ordinarily also 
temporal progressions since if x0 has time t, then x1 will have ordinarily have time t +1. In principle, some 
trajectories may also be reversible – but this would, of course, be contrary to Dollo’s law. 
19 Etiological dynamics may be true globally within a system or only within certain locales. This distinction does 
not matter for our purposes here. 
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Figure 3. Micro Cross-Section of a Non-Ergodic Dynamical System (depicting ‘Causal Dependence’ 
for O1) 
It is easy to see that even if causal dependence is true for O1, if trajectory T1 has high trajectory 
propensity, then O1 is highly probable to obtain. Perhaps, features of phase points found on T1 
render that it has high propensity vis-à-vis T2, and thus replays of the system will, probably, result in 
the occurrence of O1 rather than O2. It is a neglect of the idea of trajectory propensity that has led to 
a failure to distinguish Beatty’s (2006) causal dependence from the nomic certainty of initial 
conditions in a modal analysis of biological forms. The possibility of high trajectory propensity 
presents reason to doubt that etiological structures, on their own, like the causal dependence sense 
can lead to evitable outcomes. And, if trajectories with high propensity turned out to be pervasive in 
the biological world, then accounts of evolutionary contingency that neglect trajectories with high 
propensity would have too wide a scope; that is, these accounts would have recognised more 
evolutionary contingency than there actually is in the biological world. 
However, the etiological structure of a system remains a determinant component for the evitability 
of biological forms. This is because whether an outcome is counterfactually robust depends on the 
etiological structures of the surrounding region within the dynamical system. For example, if a phase 
point is absolutely insensitive to initial conditions, in that all trajectories reach it, then there is 
maximal counterfactual robustness. Thus, in addition to the propensity of trajectories, the 
etiological structures of the (set of) trajectories are also relevant. 
Given these considerations, the biological evitability of an outcome is some function of both the 
modal components of (a) trajectory propensity and (b) counterfactual robustness, which is in turn 
determined by the etiological dynamics of the (set of) trajectories that lead up to the outcome. The 
latter has been the primary focus of previous discussions of evolutionary contingency. However, to 
exclude either modal component would be to commit a conceptual oversight concerning what it is 
to be biologically evitable. The causal dependence sense, per se, was guilty of neglecting the former 
component. And so, an appreciation of trajectory propensity affords a more complete analysis of the 
modality of biological forms than previously recognised. 
This distinction can also help make sense of existing views. Conway Morris’s (2003) chief claim is that 
humans become inevitable once life on Earth has begun. However, Conway Morris (2003) remains 
indifferent to whether life on Earth is bound to occur; in other words, it has been very much left as 
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an open question. In fact, the (apparent) uniqueness of intelligent life might suggest that such initial 
conditions are nomically improbable. Nonetheless, Conway Morris (2003) can be interpreted as 
arguing for the counterfactual robustness of humans whilst remaining silent on the issue of 
trajectory propensities. 
Moreover, this distinction between modalities would help explain Gould’s insistence on discounting 
stochastic processes, such as genetic drift, as sources of contingency whilst affirming the importance 
of historical particulars (c.f. Beatty, 2006). Most varieties of genetic drift would account for only 
trajectory propensity, whilst the question of which historical particular obtains would account for 
only counterfactual robustness. Perhaps, Gould had in mind only counterfactual robustness when 
thinking about contingency. 
Before I analyse some other senses of contingency in light of the notion of trajectory propensity, 
there is a worry that the recognition of trajectory propensity as distinct from counterfactual 
robustness has been merely a matter of perspective. That is – facts that were relevant to the 
propensity of trajectories (e.g. features captured by the trajectories’ phase points) can be simply re-
cast as facts that are relevant to an outcome’s counterfactual robustness. If this is true, then the 
biological evitability of an outcome can be fully accounted for by the conditions of the etiological 
structures without the need for a superfluous notion like trajectory propensity. This is false, and I 
submit that there is a real conceptual distinction between trajectory propensity and counterfactual 
robustness for a given model. 
Sober’s (1988) bowl analogy is illustrative of such a distinction. A bowl with a single equilibrium state 
(i.e. with only one well at the bottom) is said to have an outcome that is counterfactually robust. This 
is because wherever a marble is released at the top of the bowl, the marble will rest in the same 
place at the bottom of the bowl (i.e. there is an equilibrium point). As such, what explains this 
counterfactual robustness is (inter alia): the force of gravity, the shape of the bowl, and its having 
only one well. But these facts are distinct from the facts that determine where the marble is released 
(e.g. facts determining where the agent’s hand goes). It was true that given that the outcome is 
insensitive to conditions, where the marble is released does not affect which outcome is realised. 
But, now, suppose that the bowl has two wells such that there is some sensitivity to initial 
conditions: let us say that if the marble is released on the left side, it ends up in the left well, and if 
its released on the right side, it ends up on the right well. Further suppose that our agent is a right-
handed individual and will, quite consistently, release the marble on the right side. Under these 
circumstances, out of all the trials that one can conduct, the marble will almost certainly rest in the 
well that is on the right. But, the point, however, is that, within this model, the facts that explains 
the counterfactual robustness (e.g. gravity, shape of bowl, number of wells, etc.) are clearly distinct 
from the fact(s) that determine where the marble is released, namely, that the agent is right-
handed. So, trajectory propensity is distinct from counterfactual robustness for any given model20. 
Also hinging on this distinction of modality is the reason why certain ‘sources of contingency’ are, 
problematically, theoretically excluded unless evolutionary contingency satisfies the feature of 
biological evitability. The examples previously presented (viz. fluctuating adaptive landscapes and 
RNA nucleobases) account for only trajectory propensity and not for any of the etiological dynamics 
of the system at hand. That is – they do not explain why certain (sets of) trajectories behave the way 
they do, but only that certain trajectories are more or less probable. For example, the reason why 
                                                          
20 Even if one were to incorporate ‘handedness’ into the model, there would still be the probability of an agent 
being right-handed (demographic data indicates that it will be quite high). The point is that no matter what is 
to constitute the initial conditions, there will be some nomic probability for those initial conditions. 
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the nucleobases ‘A, U, C, G’ are more probable than alternative nucleobases to constitute RNA does 
not explain the ostensible fact that ‘had the constitution of RNA been just slightly different, then life 
would have been markedly different’. 
As such, if evolutionary contingency did not entail evitability but merely asserted certain etiological 
structures, then the sorts of biological phenomena that account only for trajectory propensity in 
their determination of evitability are excluded. In other words, if sensitivity to initial conditions is all 
that there is to evolutionary contingency, then the nomic regularity of RNA bases, fluctuating 
adaptive landscapes, and so on. are irrelevant since they do not explain sensitivity to initial 
conditions. Accordingly, this serves as an additional reason for why biological evitability is a 
desideratum of evolutionary contingency: some sources of contingency ordinarily taken to account 
for contingency are theoretically excluded unless evolutionary contingency satisfies the feature of 
biological evitability. 
The key point of this section, thus far, has been that biological evitability is dependent on both 
trajectory propensity and counterfactual robustness. And, I have shown that Beatty’s (2006) causal 
dependence neglected trajectory propensity. However, contra their respective advocates, many of 
the other major accounts of contingency also fail to entail evitable outcomes due to a neglect of 
trajectory propensity. I shall now enlist a series of demonstrations to show how these senses of 
evolutionary contingency also fail the biological evitability desideratum. 
4.2. Trajectory Propensity vis-à-vis Other Accounts of Evolutionary Contingency 
The interpretation of evolutionary contingency that has garnered the greatest following is 
contingency as ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ (e.g. Ben-Menahem 1997, 2009; Sterelny 2005; 
Powell, 2012; Powell & Mariscal, 2015). Sensitivity to initial conditions is similar to causal 
dependence in that they both attribute causal power to the antecedent events in determining 
outcomes (and hence, emphasise the importance of history), but they are not the same. For an 
outcome that is ‘causally dependent’ (Beatty, 2006), there is a causally necessary antecedent, and, 
furthermore, if that antecedent were to be different, then there would be a different outcome. 
Sensitivity to initial conditions is a stronger notion that also admits of gradations. 
There is sensitivity to initial conditions, if minor changes to initial conditions are sufficient to elicit 
drastic changes in outcome. In contrast, an outcome that is wholly insensitive to initial conditions 
entails that the event is a necessary occurrence in that system: regardless of the initial conditions 
that hold, the event will occur all the same. 
Often touted as its virtue, sensitivity to initial conditions does not prima facie have any tensions with 
determinism since it does not assert that the same initial conditions yield different outcomes. 
Rather, markedly different outcomes result from similar initial conditions whereby these initial 
conditions may or may not have uniquely determined their outcomes. Sensitivity to initial conditions 
is neutral with respect to determinism. 
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Figure 4. Sensitivity to Initial Conditions 
However, sensitivity to initial conditions is also subject to the same shortcoming as the causal 
dependence sense in that it, on its own, fails to entail a difference in outcomes. This is because there 
may be initial conditions that are nomically probable, such that they are conducive to high trajectory 
propensity (of trajectories in which they are a part). The fact that an outcome is sensitive to initial 
conditions is simply uninformative with regards to whether or not certain initial conditions are 
nomically probable. That is – even though an evolutionary outcome may be highly sensitive to 
differences in initial conditions, what reason is there to suppose that a different trajectory would 
have been realised? A high sensitivity to initial conditions is wholly compatible with an inevitable 
outcome if the trajectory that leads to that outcome has maximal or minimal propensity. For 
example, suppose that the evolution of an adaptive complex depended on the body of genetic 
material contained in a particular genome, G1. But, further suppose that G1 differs minutely to 
another genome, G2, by only one base pair. As such, the outcome – namely, the evolution of the 
adaptive complex – is highly sensitive to initial conditions. However, despite this sensitivity to initial 
conditions, the adaptive complex may not be likely to come about. Perhaps, high-fidelity error-
checking mechanisms make it unlikely that G2 is ever prevalent enough in the population for the 
adaptive complex to evolve. Clearly, sensitivity to initial conditions is not enough for the evitability of 
forms. 
I, now, consider path dependence, and make a distinction between Type I path dependence as it is 
commonly used in the economics literature (e.g. Arthur, 1989; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; David, 
2001) and a more sophisticated account, Type II path dependence, developed by Desjardins (2011a, 
2015, 2016). The former is used in economics and the social sciences to demonstrate that (arbitrary) 
choices of earlier paths can lead to ‘lock-in’ effects and market failures. However, this type of path 
dependence, despite its emphasising the effects of the past on the future, can nonetheless result in 
inevitable outcomes. This is because, as I shall explain, Type I path dependence turns solely on the 
existence of alternative paths from an initial state, the probabilities of which change as a result of 
previous realisations. Desjardins’ path dependence, however, entails the evitability of outcomes 
since it explicitly stipulates that there are multiple possible outcomes. 
Type I path dependence asserts that travel on certain paths precludes or reduces the probability of 
travel on downstream paths and entails that there must be multiple alternative paths from an 
initiating point. In other words, an outcome is Type I path dependent if and only if it is at the end of 
a causal chain that changes as a function of prior events realised. An example definition: 
Path Dependence (Type I): A path dependent stochastic process is one whose … distribution 
evolves as a consequence (function of) the process’s own history. (David, 2001; emphasis 
added) 
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However, this definition does not require that there be multiple outcomes: insofar as there are 
alternative paths from the initiating point, and the probability of downstream paths changes as a 
consequence of previous path realised, then there is Type I path dependence21. The below branching 
diagram illustrates an instance of Type I path dependence, as is consistent with the above definition. 
But notice that there is only one outcome; O1 is inevitable in that it will always occur no matter the 
paths that are realised to reach it. However, this system may be said to be transiently path 
dependent; that is, the realisation of B1 or B2 does affect the probabilities of events at intermediary 
stage C. Nonetheless, although it may serve its purpose in the economic or social science literature 
in emphasising the importance of history, since Type I path dependence can fail to entail the 
evitability of its outcomes, it fails as an account of evolutionary contingency. 
 
Figure 5. Type I Path Dependence Branching Diagram 
There is, however, an account of path dependence that entails the evitability of forms since it 
requires there to be multiple outcomes with non-trivial objective probabilities of occurrence22. 
Desjardins (2011a) proposes this account, which attributes non-trivial (other than 1 or 0) 
probabilities to outcomes, and employs a branching diagram to illustrate:   
                                                          
21 It is unclear whether David (2001) intended to necessitate the multiplicity of possible outcomes or whether 
he meant to leave it an open question. In the same paper, he offers a ‘negative definition’ of path dependence 
by specifying its non-ergodicity which entails that there is not an invariant probability distribution that is 
continuous across all possible instances. Consistent with non-ergodic systems, however, is that there is only 
one possible outcome at the last instance. So, even his negative definition of path dependence is Type I. 
22 There may be a background issue here in that disagreement exists concerning whether non-trivial objective 
chances are congruent with determinism. We have come full circle to the indeterminism issue. 
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Figure 6. Branching Tree of Type II Path Dependence (Redrawn from Desjardins, 2011a) The 
numbers next to the arrows specify the probability of that path. 
From the branching diagram, one can see that the probability of the outcome, either S1 or S2, 
changes with the path taken by the process. Incidentally, in this example, the probabilities of the 
outcome S1 and S2 are the same at the outset (i.e. 0.5), but their respective probabilities change as 
soon as the first splitting event. However, importantly for our purposes here, there is more than one 
possible outcome (namely, S1 and S2) since there are non-trivial (other than one or zero) 
probabilities specified for these two outcomes: i.e. 0.5 and 0.5 (they need not have different 
probabilities). From the branching diagram, both S1 and S2 are evitable outcomes. 
Powell (2012) initially proposes a ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ account that fails to entail 
evitability for the reasons mentioned previously. However, Powell appears to recognise this 
shortcoming in a later co-authored paper (Powell and Mariscal, 2015), and applies the quick and 
easy fix of stipulating that the initial conditions of an evolutionarily contingent outcome ought to be 
of low objective probability. In this way, the antecedents of an evolutionarily contingent outcome 
are ex hypothesi “unlikely to be replicated across the vast majority of alternative evolutionary 
histories” (Ibid). This amended ‘radical contingency’ account (Ibid.) effectively couples low trajectory 
propensity with a high sensitivity to initial conditions, such that the outcomes are, now, evitable. 
5. Contingency as Non-Trivial Objective Probability 
Thus far, I have argued that biological evitability is an important desideratum for an account of 
evolutionary contingency and that some accounts of contingency have failed in this respect. In the 
second half of this paper, I shall characterise an understanding of evolutionary contingency as non-
trivial objective probability. This new account shall be compared and contrasted with previous 
proposals and, then, evaluated in light of some desiderata. It shall be seen that the new account 
satisfies all three desiderata. However, it is not the only account that is able to do so: Desjardins’ 
path dependence (2011a, 2015, 2016) account fares equally just as well. Although there are some 
differences between the path dependence account and the non-trivial objective probability account 
in terms of how they emphasise the importance of history, there is no obvious way to adjudicate 
between them for an account of evolutionary contingency. Perhaps, there is to be a sense of 
plurality for evolutionary contingency; for now, I leave it an open question. 
In what is to follow, I identify two additional desiderata, both of which are demanded by certain 
normative and scientific considerations: (i) being able to vary in degree and (ii) subsuming 
historicities. It should be said that the three desiderata (including biological evitability) considered in 
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this paper are not necessarily exhaustive; that is – there may be other desiderata that are not 
presently entertained23. But, as we shall see, the various accounts of evolutionary contingency can 
already fare quite differently with respect to the three desiderata (this is summed up later in Table 
1). 
Evolutionary Contingency as Non-Trivial Objective Probability: An outcome is evolutionarily 
contingent if and only if it has a non-trivial (not 1 or 0) objective total probability within a 
specified modal range 
There are a few crucial ideas to unpack in this definition. Firstly, evolutionary contingency would be 
concerned with the objective probability, as opposed to the subjective probability, of an outcome’s 
evolution. In other words, evolutionary contingency would not be an epistemic notion that is 
concerned with what evolutionary biologists, given their knowledge, can predict about how 
probable (or often) an outcome occurs. Rather, the definition is such that evolutionary contingency 
is about the fact of the matter regarding the probability that an outcome evolves, which is in turn 
governed by the relevant evolutionary dynamics, natural facts, and historical particulars. 
Secondly, evolutionary contingency would be about the unconditional probability (or, what I call, 
total probability, for reasons to become apparent) of an outcome. This is in contrast to conditional 
probabilities, which are inherent to Desjardins’ path dependence account. This distinction is 
important because conditional probabilities of an outcome do not change when certain modal facts 
change (e.g. the addition of alternative trajectories), whereas total probabilities do change. 
Thirdly, by virtue of asserting non-trivial (not 1 or 0) probabilities, this conception already satisfies 
the desideratum of biological evitability, as it precludes necessity in either an evolutionary outcome 
obtaining or not obtaining. In other words, if an outcome does not have 1 or 0 objective probability, 
then it is genuinely uncertain whether it will evolve. 
Lastly, with the help of the modal range (Wong, 2019), this account offers an explicit way to specify 
the extent (geographically, nomologically, counterfactually, etcetera) to which contingency allegedly 
extends. In other words, the modal range defines the reference class of the probability statements 
inherent in contingency claims and, thus, outlines their satisfaction conditions. Under a frequentist 
interpretation, the probability would be just how many times the form evolves out of the total 
number of evolutionary scenarios in the modal range24. 
In line with evolutionary contingency being a naturalistic thesis about how evolution behaves (rather 
than some mysterious metaphysical thesis), an outcome’s objective probability of evolution is 
dependent on the evolutionary dynamics that govern the outcome’s evolution within a specific 
modal range. As per section 4, these dynamics are, in turn, determined by various natural facts and 
histories pertinent to the evolution of that outcome within a specific modal range. The contention 
within the contingency debate, then, is whether the evolutionary dynamics are, indeed, sufficient to 
entail with high probability that certain outcomes evolve. The hard adaptationists would claim 
precisely just that. For them, the evolutionary dynamics comprise of a ‘strong’ sense of natural 
selection-cum-variation that is able to reach the highest of adaptive peaks. As a result, certain 
outcomes (namely, optimal traits) have a high objective probability of evolution (within the modal 
                                                          
23 One need not exhaustively consider the full complement of desiderata (which I imagine is a matter of 
contention in and of itself) in order to put forth the new account for consideration. 
24 Even under a (single or long-term) propensity interpretation of probability, frequencies of outcomes would 
be indicative of the likelihoods (technical sense) of various propensity probabilistic theses. For the purposes of 
this paper, a distinction between various interpretations of probability need not be made. 
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range); the evolutionary dynamics of a system will reliably guarantee their occurrence. Equally, 
however, the evolutionary dynamics are a function of the various histories that impinge. After all, 
phase points describe not just natural facts but historical facts. Therein lies the empirical 
disagreement between the contingentists and non-contingentists. 
Relatedly, notice that, under the proposed account, the probability of an evolutionary outcome also 
depends on the past. More specifically, in accordance with the chain rule, an outcome’s probability 
is also determined by the product of the probabilities of preceding phase points and/or transitions 
(this is congruent with dynamical trajectory propensity). To see this, consider the following two-step 
causal pathway: 
 
Figure 7. Causal Pathway of O1 
This particular example is two-stepped because the final outcome, O1, is preceded by two events: A1 
and B125. The dotted grey lines indicate that A1 could lead to some other event(s), B(x), and, B1, itself, 
can lead to O events other than O1. That A1 and B1 can lead to other events, which is just to say that 
there are alternative possibilities from A1 and B1, can also be inferred by B1 and O1 possessing an 
objective probability of less than 1. The blue values represent unconditional probabilities of an event 
whilst the red values represent transition probabilities (or conditional probabilities of one event 
from another). 
Consider the possible transition from B1 to O1, where the transition probability is 0.6. As before, this 
transition and its probability are determined by the relevant nomologies governing that movement. 
For example, if O1 is a particular mutational state, then that which determines the probability of a 
prior mutational state, B1, transitioning to O1 are presumably facts relevant to random mutations 
(e.g. chemical facts, physical facts, etcetera). Collectively, these facts make it such that the transition 
probability of reaching O1 is 0.6. 
Now, suppose that only A1 obtained. That is – it is, now, uncertain whether B1, as opposed to 
another B event, will obtain. The probability of realising O1 would then be 0.18 (i.e. 0.3 ∗ 0.6). This 
makes intuitive sense as there is, now, greater uncertainty as to whether B1 will occur: a different 
event, B(x), may occur in lieu of B1, and then O1 would have failed to occur. Take even one step 
further back and consider the scenario whereby even A1 had not yet obtained. In this case, the 
objective probability of O1 is 0.072 (i.e. 0.4 ∗ 0.3 ∗ 0.6) since it is still an open question whether even 
A1 will occur. A1’s objective probability is only 0.4, after all. In fact, as the number of preceding 
events on which O1 is dependent upon increases (insofar as they are less than 1 probability), O1’s 
objective probability decreases. As we shall see in more detail, this relates to an adjustment of the 
                                                          
25 As an aside, recognising the number of steps depends on the grain invoked; B1 need not strictly be 
continuously preceding O1. That is – there may be a number of intermediary steps between B1 and O1. 
However, this complication does not affect the value of the transition probabilities, which is equivalent to the 
probability of O1 conditional upon B1. 
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modal range. But, in brief, as we extend the modal range, there is greater opportunity for evolution 
to veer away from path(s) that realise O1. 
The single pathway picture presented above is simplified, for it does not take into account 
alternative sequences of events in which O1 could obtain. It is entirely possible that, in addition to 
the above causal pathway, there are two additional pathways that each consist of two preceding 
events. In this case, the total objective probability of O1 will be the products of the probability of 
each event in each individual causal pathway, summed together (as per Kolmogorov’s axioms). 
 
Figure 8. Multi-Causal Pathway to O1. (Assume that there are no other pathways to O1.) 
So, whilst the evolution of O1 based only on trajectory 1 is 0.0072, when all trajectories are 
considered, the total probability of evolution increases is 0.14 (as to respect the presence of any 
counterfactual robustness). The presence of alternative trajectories is, precisely, the second sort of 
modal component (i.e. counterfactual robustness) that evolutionary contingency ought to capture. 
This is especially crucial within the context of evolutionary biology whereby it is not uncommon for 
there to be more than one path for realising an evolutionary outcome. For example, on a molecular 
level, it has been demonstrated that there are multiple mutational pathways to glucose transport 
efficiency of E. coli (Manch et al., 1999). 
Evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability is also unifying in that it encompasses 
past proposals of contingency. That is – non-trivial objective probability of an outcome can be 
accounted for by some combination of etiological structures, if that should be the case. For example, 
an evolutionary outcome with a non-trivial objective probability can be produced in a system 
whereby there is sensitivity to initial conditions or path dependence insofar as there are low 
probability antecedents. 
Relatedly, notice that evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability is consistent with 
either of Gould’s versions of the tape of life. Insofar as an outcome has a non-trivial objective 
probability, it is evolutionarily contingent whether an alteration of initial conditions would have 
produced a different outcome (replaying the tape of life from different conditions) or whether the 
same initial conditions would have produced a different outcome (replaying the tape of life from the 
same conditions). That is – evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability incorporates 
both forms of modalities: trajectory propensity and counterfactual robustness. There is no need to 
quarrel about which version of the tape of life metaphor Gould really had in mind – both are 
consistent with evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability. 
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There has been a lingering question throughout: what does it mean, exactly, for an outcome to have 
a particular probability of evolution? The answer can be spelled out with the concept of the modal 
range (Wong, 2019). 
Contingency claims are about the repeatability of certain biological forms across an array of 
evolutionary scenarios. But, barring some exceptions26, most contingency-theorists advocate that 
questions of evolutionary contingency are about the prevalence of biological forms amidst the 
variance of certain, important evolutionary conditions of epistemic interest. In other words, a 
biological form is non-contingent if it invariantly evolves in a wide range of evolutionary scenarios 
where (inter alia) the initial conditions, geographical space, developmental generators, history, or, 
even nomological laws (may) differ between scenarios. The range of evolutionary scenarios under 
consideration is called the modal range.  
Modal Range: The Range of (Actual or Non-Actual) Evolutionary Scenarios, Under 
Consideration, in which an Outcome can Evolve 
Accordingly, for any question of evolutionary contingency, what is being asked is whether the 
evolutionary dynamics within that modal range are sufficient to result in the repetitive (or probable) 
evolution of certain outcomes within that range. A different modal range index entails a different 
contingency question and is likely to result in a different answer. 
Under the proposed probabilistic account, specifying the modal range is tantamount to specifying 
the reference class of a contingency claim. For instance, when it is said that a form has a specific 
probability of evolution, it is meant that the form evolves to that probability within a modal range. 
For any given outcome and modal range, if the probability of evolution is high, then the outcome is 
not very evolutionarily contingent (for the modal range). Conversely, for any given outcome and 
modal range, if the probability of evolution is low, then the form is evolutionarily contingent (for the 
modal range). It is when the proposed account is combined with the modal range that contingency 
claims are formulated in a conceptually precise way:  
An outcome, O, is evolutionarily contingent in modal range, R, to the degree of objective 
probability, P (where P is in between 1 and 0). 
This, then, presents a clear set of satisfaction conditions, which can be determined by some 
empirical means. Naturally, some modal ranges will offer high empirical tractability and others less 
so. Modal ranges that extend to nomologically inconsistent worlds or to the deep past may present 
difficulties for evaluation. Moreover, some modal ranges will be so narrow as to be uninteresting for 
evolutionary contingency. For example, whether some outcome evolves within a grossly restricted 
region of geographic space and time period tells us little about the general nomologies and 
historicities that one is ordinarily concerned with.  
In general, the determination of the modal range is wholly dependent on the contingency-theorist’s 
epistemic project and the nature of the evidence at hand (c.f. Wong, 2019). Relevant to its 
specification, the modal range can also differ according to the degree of variance amongst the range 
of evolutionary scenarios. If the modal range consists of differing evolutionary scenarios, then the 
                                                          
26 For example, Beatty (2016, 2017) thinks that no initial differences need to exist between alternative replays 
of the tape of life in order for there to be different biological outcomes. Differences will naturally accumulate 
over time between ‘replays’ in an indeterminist universe. Contingency questions, then, can even be about the 
prevalence of form amongst a series of initially identical evolutionary scenarios. (If, however, evolutionary 
scenarios are coarse-grained enough to contain ‘hidden variables’, then such a position need not oppose 
causal determinism.) This also relates to parallel replay experiments (see later discussion). 
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probability of the outcome’s evolution speaks to the effect that those differences across scenarios 
impose. For example, if an outcome’s probability of evolution turns out to be the same within two 
different modal ranges, where the first range contains evolutionary scenarios with an ostensibly 
important historical event and the second contains only evolutionary scenarios without that event, 
then it can be concluded that the historical event had no effect on the evolution of the outcome. In 
this case, the historical event had been made the independent variable which, as it turns out, made 
no difference to the outcome’s probability of evolution. There is counterfactual robustness, so to 
speak. However, if the modal range consists of identical evolutionary scenarios, then the probability 
of an outcome’s evolution speaks to only trajectory propensity. Some claims asserting contingency 
are made precisely when it is suspected that there are some independent variables, which do make 
a difference to a particular outcome’s probability of evolution: e.g. ‘the evolution of trait A is 
evolutionarily contingent because the necessary genetic precursor is not always possessed across 
species’. As we shall see later, experimenters (e.g. Blount, 2016; Blount et al., 2018) have 
manipulated the modal range, in this way, in order to derive certain conclusions from their studies. 
In the remainder of this section, I shall consider evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective 
probability in light of two additional desiderata. 
5.1 Varying in Degree 
In concert with my positive argument for evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective 
probability, I shall argue that evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability also 
satisfies the desideratum of varying in degree. In fact, it offers a single and straightforward means of 
fleshing out how contingency claims can differ by strength. Evolutionary outcomes are more or less 
contingent just in case the set of evolutionary outcomes are more or less probable within the modal 
range. Hence, if a certain evolutionary outcome has a high objective total probability of evolving 
within a modal range, then it is not very contingent. Conversely, if an outcome has a low total 
objective probability of evolving within the modal range, then it is highly contingent. 
Contingency-theorists have consistently suggested that evolutionary contingency ought to be able to 
vary in degree (e.g. Beatty 2006; Desjardins, 2011a; Powell, 2012). This is driven by the normative 
consideration that the concept should map realistically onto the natural world where different 
evolutionary systems seemingly exhibit varying levels of contingency. Desjardins (2011a), for 
example, notes that, as per standard population genetics, the probability of evolving certain 
adaptive complexes is affected by the rate at which beneficial mutations occur (μ). But μ, itself, is 
affected by population size (N) which can vary drastically from population to population, and species 
to species. Small population sizes, with lower μ, will have a lower probability of evolving certain 
adaptive complexes than larger population sizes with a higher μ, ceteris paribus. For Desjardins 
(2011a), since population sizes vary widely in the natural world, it is also expected that different 
levels of contingency will be exhibited27. Similarly, population size also covaries with the strength of 
drift (Wright, 1931). Thus, if drift is taken to be a source of contingency, then there is yet another 
way for population size to influence the strength of contingency. Of course, none of this is to say 
that population size is the only way to affect the degree of contingency; rather, evolutionarily 
contingent dynamics are likely to be multi-variate and complex. The point is that population genetics 
suffice to stipulate that if μ and/or genetic drift affect the level of contingency, then evolutionary 
                                                          
27 The implicit assumption is that contingency depends on μ and that the strength of contingency is not 
balanced out by other factors. 
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contingency does indeed vary in degree. These normative considerations constitute as reasons for 
the first desideratum. 
Now, if evolutionary contingency can vary in degree, then it is also spectral in the sense that there 
exists a range of views from the extreme to the intermediary (see Figure 9). Traditionally, 
contingency-theorists have, for convenience or otherwise, characterised the debate about 
evolutionary contingency in terms of two diametrically opposing views often dubbed the 
contingency thesis and the robust repeatability view or the robust view of life (RVL). Marking the 
opposition in this way is infelicitous as no actual biologist or contingency-theorist believes that any 
evolutionary system is entirely contingent or non-contingent. In reality, disagreements consist of 
opponents holding two intermediary views that are nonetheless inconsistent on account of their 
assertions of different levels of contingency. 
Figure 9. Contingency Spectrum (Wong, 2019) 
The way in which evolutionary contingency is construed such as to be able to vary in degree depends 
on the sense of contingency invoked. However, evolutionary contingency as Beatty’s (2006) causal 
dependence is strictly a binary notion: either an outcome is causally dependent on (i.e. covaries 
with) an antecedent or it is not. 
In a recent paper, Lewis (2018) suggests that contingency is weaker or stronger depending on the 
relative ‘volumes’ of the set of initial conditions and outcomes. A volume, in Lewis’ analysis, refers to 
the region of phase points in any hyperspace of possibility (e.g. a region in a morphospace). 
According to Lewis (2018), if a small volume of initial conditions leads to a large volume of outcomes, 
then contingency is said to be strong. This way of cashing out the way in which sensitivity to initial 
conditions varies in degree differs to that of Ben-Menahem (1997) and Powell (2012). 
Ben-Menahem (1997) and Powell (2012) stipulate that the degree to which contingency varies is 
dependent only on the extent of differences between two sets of initial conditions. If slightly 
different initial conditions are sufficient to entail a different outcome, then the outcome is highly 
sensitive to initial conditions. If large differences in initial conditions are required before another 
outcome results, then the outcome of concern is lowly sensitive to initial conditions. The difference 
between the concerned outcome and the alternative outcome that would have resulted does not 
factor into the degree to which an outcome is sensitive to initial conditions. Ben-Menahem’s (1997) 
and Powell’s (2012) accounts are one-dimensional in this respect, whereas Lewis’ account (2018) is 
two-dimensional. 
Desjardins (2011a) suggests that path dependence can vary in degree according to three ways. 
Firstly, since path dependent processes admit of multiple outcomes, one can ask how similar the 
alternative outcomes are. If the outcomes are similar (according to some to-be-defined metric), then 
there is not much path dependence. The second concerns the number of paths that lead to one 
particular outcome. The lesser number of paths, the more path dependent an outcome is. The third 
way, and the central focus of Desjardins’ two papers (2011a and 2011b), is how different the 
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conditional probabilities of the possible outcomes are from each other28. For example, consider the 
branching diagrams of Figure 10, (a) and (b). According to Desjardins, the scenario illustrated in (a) is 
one of path dependence to a low degree because the conditional probabilities are nearly equitable 
whilst (b) is a scenario that is highly path dependent.  
 
Figure 10. (a) Desjardins’ Weak Path Dependence (b) Desjardins’ Strong Path Dependence 
With both sensitivity to initial conditions and path dependence, there is more than one way to 
construe how contingency varies in degree. It is not obvious that any one of these ways is superior. 
Perhaps, contingency is pluralistic with respect to the way in which it varies in degree, under these 
accounts. Ultimately, these two accounts nonetheless satisfy this desideratum unlike the causal 
dependence sense (see Table 1 at the end of the section). I shall now argue that the non-trivial 
objective probability also emphasises the importance of history. 
5.2 Subsumes Biological Historicities 
As discussed in section 3, the lesson from Wonderful Life (1989) is that history, itself, can be shaky.  
Gould elaborated in his final and grand monograph, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2002), 
that history has a particular role to play in determining evolutionary outcomes. More specifically, the 
majority of historical evolutionary events “happened to happen in a certain particular way [my 
emphasis added]” (Ibid.) such that outcomes occurred in a certain way. The ‘happened to happen’ is 
telling here for it suggests that the historical event(s) in question need not have occurred – they have 
an objective probability of less than one. And yet, at the same time, downstream outcomes are 
significantly dependent on their occurrence. And so, for Gould, not only are some downstream 
outcomes dependent on historical events (i.e. causal dependence) but also that these historical 
events, themselves, may be uncertain. 
In evolutionary biology, the conjunction of these two ideas has come to be known as historicities, 
first coined by Lewontin (1967), a close collaborator of Gould. Lewontin (1967) demonstrated that 
the dynamics of a population are affected by the probability distribution and ordering of various 
environmental features (Ibid.). These environmental features are what he considered to be 
historicities. Recent works, including Beatty and Desjardins (2009), Desjardins (2011a, 2011b, 2016), 
and Sterelny (2016), have redirected attention to the importance of biological historicities. It is 
argued, for instance, that historicities are the way in which outcomes are evolutionarily contingent 
(Beatty and Desjardins, 2009). 
Historicities can be encapsulated by biological phenomena that are, indeed, quite central to modern 
evolutionary theory and were originally brought to bear by the so-called internalists (Gould, 1977; 
                                                          
28 May I suggest that this is best quantitatively formalised with Shannon’s (1948) information entropy; the 
larger the entropy, the greater the contingency. 
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Gould and Lewontin, 1979). These phenomena do not so much as constitute important historical 
events on which future outcomes are hinged but, rather, they are the mechanisms by which future 
outcomes are constrained by certain low probability historical events. These phenomena include 
(but are not limited to) developmental constraints, phylogenetic inertia, and, genetic inheritance. 
They are united by the fact that they describe the constraining effects that individual events like 
random mutation, meiosis, or recombination have on evolving lineages; namely, a constraint on the 
possibility of downstream outcomes. For example, without the inheritance of the appropriate 
genetic material, offspring will simply not evolve certain traits. À la Krebs and Davies (1981), zebras 
cannot evolve machine guns with which to fend against predators, so to speak, due to their not 
inheriting the right genetic material (c.f. Shanahan, 2008). 
But biological historicities extend beyond the genetic, developmental, or, phylogenetic. Factors such 
as asteroid impacts, mass extinctions, or geographic events can be rare occurrences that affect 
evolutionary outcomes. In the case of the Cambrian extinction (Gould, 1989), the series of sampling 
events that ultimately rendered the Pikaia a survivor, could have occurred differently, resulting in a 
different set of remaining forms. And hence, what matters is not only that there is causal 
dependence, but that the events themselves might not have occurred. It is the latter that precludes 
one version of the replaying the tape of life from apparently being a trivial exercise. On account of 
these historicities, the tape of life can be re-played, even without alteration, such that a different 
result obtains. After all, "[t]he divine tape player holds a million scenarios” (Gould, 1989). History is 
important, partly, because it is not certain29. Gould meant that evolution is contingent by way of the 
uncertainty of the past. 
Evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability gels well with such a picture. As 
mentioned earlier, objective probabilities of an outcome are dependent on the probability of 
preceding events, which, themselves, may have a probability of less than one (and more than zero). 
In other words, when those preceding events have a probability of less than one (and more than 
zero), they are uncertain. In contrast, evolutionary contingency as sensitivity to initial conditions, for 
example, does not subsume historicities. That is – the sensitivity of an outcome to its initial condition 
does not co-vary with the probability that certain initial conditions obtain. Even if the initial 
conditions had a high probability, as opposed to a low probability, the outcome would just be as 
sensitive to initial conditions. The reason is because what matters to sensitivity to initial conditions is 
whether a slightly different initial condition would have resulted in a markedly different outcome 
(Ben-Menahem 1997; Powell, 2012). On the other hand, path dependence (Type I and Type II) does 
subsume historicities as the probabilities of outcomes are a function of past events realised. 
Depending on which historical events, certain outcomes are made more or less probable; history is a 
difference maker. 
There have been repeated efforts to recognise biological historicities30. For example, numerous 
authors have argued that the K-Pg asteroid drastically changed the environmental conditions of 
almost all species (e.g. Alvarez et al., 1980). One notable effect of the impact of the asteroid was the 
formation of dust clouds, which induced not only a global greenhouse effect, but greatly reduced the 
                                                          
29 As a note aside, Gould took the uncertainty of evolutionary outcomes to be consistent with scientific 
enterprise. First, non-trivial probability events are taken to be nomologically consistent and explanatorily 
sound as supported by Gould’s usage of “sensible channel”, “each perfectly sensible” and “subject to rigorous 
explanation” (1989). Secondly, Gould claimed in Wonderful Life (1989), and elsewhere, that science itself is a 
study of history or that science requires historical narratives (idiographies). 
30 Orgogozo (2015) has impressively compiled a lengthy taxonomy of historicities, explicitly referring to the low 
probability nature of these events. 
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number of photosynthesizing plants. The latter led to the decline and eventual extinction of 
dinosaurs. However, as the story goes, only when dinosaurs were out of the way, could mammals 
(including our ancestors) proliferate and expand. These significant downstream events are hinged on 
the asteroid impact, which is taken to be a rare occurrence.  
There has been one particularly significant and well-documented study to which I wish to turn my 
focus: the Long Term Evolutionary Experiment (LTEE) by Blount et al. (2008). Twelve initially identical 
populations of E. coli, which did not have the ability to metabolise citrate for energy, were put on a 
glucose-limited medium that also contained citrate. At the 31,500 generation mark, one population 
(Cit+) miraculously evolved the ability to metabolise citrate, which enabled the population to 
explode in size. The new ability was taken to be a marvel due to certain chemical challenges of 
utilising citrate in oxic conditions (Koser et al., 1924; Lütgens & Gottschalk, 1980), but one of Lenski’s 
then graduate students, Blount, wondered whether such an evolutionary marvel was imminently 
repeatable or merely a fluke accident. 
Fortunately, the ingenuity of the LTEE was also found in the study’s design. At every 500 
generations, samples from each of the twelve E. coli populations were frozen, thereby accumulating 
a historical record of E. coli samples and their genomes. Blount et al. (2008) employed this to their 
advantage and systematically thawed various generations of the ancestors of the Cit+ variant. They 
subsequently subjected a variety of these ancestors to the same environmental demands (i.e. high 
citrate, low glucose medium) to test for their ability to evolve the Cit+ variant. The results were 
interesting: they discovered that only certain ancestors – those after the 20,000-generation mark – 
could repeatedly evolve the capacity to metabolise citrate. Importantly, however, ancestors before 
the 20,000 generation were unable to evolve the capacity to metabolise citrate even with a high 
number of trials. Given these two observations, Blount et al. (2008) reasoned that an important 
precursor allowing for citrate metabolism must have evolved (via random mutation) at around the 
20,000 generation mark. But this mutation must also have been rare (or of low objective 
probability), since the same mutation failed to re-occur in any of the pre-20,000 generation 
ancestors.  
In a follow up study, with the aid of DNA sequencing, Blount et al. (2012) confirmed this hypothesis 
and identified the relevant precursor gene that they dubbed citT. Although the molecular origin 
story of citT is complex (and, perhaps, this would speak to its rare occurrence), citT ultimately 
facilitated the eventual evolution of aerobic citrate utilisation through a simple duplication of citT 
and, subsequent, exaptation of it (Blount et al., 2012). In other words, the citT was just an 
evolutionary stone’s throw away from citrate usage, yet citT was a rare mutational occurrence. 
The moral of the story is that the evolution of citrate usage in the LTEE exemplifies a well-
documented historicity in that it fulfils two conditions: (i) it was a rare occurrence that need not 
have occurred and (ii) downstream outcomes are dependent on it. Clearly, a mutational event 
happened for one population of bacteria at around the 20,000 generation mark that did not occur in 
any of other initially identical populations. At the same time, once the citT was in place, the 
population was fast-tracked to the evolution of citrate usage. Gould’s point in Wonderful Life (1989) 
was that evolution is littered with these historicities. 
The manipulation of the frozen record of E. coli samples for controlled ‘replays’ also constitutes a 
case where there has been a clear adjustment of the modal range. Replays of E. coli samples at the 
20,000-generation mark constitute a narrower modal range than replays of samples before the 
20,000-generation mark since the modal range of the former spans a shorter period of evolutionary 
time. What Blount et al. (2008) showed was that the proportion of lineages evolving citrate usage 
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was higher in replays of more recent lineages (after, the 20,000 mark) than the proportion of 
lineages evolving citrate usage in replays in older lineages (i.e. 0 documented). In other words, there 
was less contingency in a narrower modal range but more contingency in a wider modal range. This 
was not surprising as the narrower modal range had the occurrence of the relevant historicity of low 
probability (i.e. the origination of the precursor, citT). 
Relatedly, in a pair of recent review articles (Blount, 2016; Blount et al., 2018), the authors 
distinguished between ‘Historical Difference Experiments’ (HDE) and ‘Parallel Replay Experiments 
(PRE). HDE’s test for counterfactual robustness of outcomes whilst PRE’s test for both counterfactual 
robustness and trajectory propensity. In Blount et al.’s (2008) study, the replays with the narrower 
modal range would have tested for only trajectory propensity (viz. even if the same historical 
precursor occurs, how often do we get the same outcome) whilst the replay with the wider modal 
range tested for both counterfactual robustness (viz. what if there had been different history) and 
trajectory propensity. 
To summarise, the below table outlines how some of the previous accounts of evolutionary 
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🗙 🗙 ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Vary in 
Degrees  
🗙 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Subsumes 
Historicities 
✔ 🗙 ✔ 🗙 ✔ 
Table 1. Evolutionary Contingency x Desiderata 
However, as can be seen, only the path dependence account and non-trivial objective probability 
account satisfy all three desiderata. That is – on the basis of the desiderata, these two accounts fare 
equally just as well. There is, however, one notable point of difference. Although both path 
dependence and contingency as non-trivial objective probability subsume historicities, the two 
accounts do so in a different way. But, quite crucially for our purposes here, it is not clear that any 
one way is superior as to render one a better account of evolutionary contingency. 
To see this, one needs to consider the original motivation for emphasising the importance of history 
in evolutionary biology. Gould and Lewontin (together and independently) intended to critique the 
adaptationist’s ahistorical approach in evaluating optimality (Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Lewontin, 
1967, 1978). Their mission was to point out that adaptationism (methodological or otherwise) failed 
to be attuned to the fact that (i) the ancestral conditions (environmental or existing substrates with 
which evolution has to modify), (ii) whether or not these ancestral conditions obtain, and (ii) their 
ordering matter to whether a specific optimal complex is reached (Griffiths, 1996; c.f. Beatty and 
Desjardins, 2009). Both the path dependence account and non-trivial objective probability account 
are able to answer to these three elements 
History is a difference maker in Desjardins’ account; depending on which antecedent events occur, 
the probabilities of the outcomes are different. Consider the following example of path 
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independence which fails Desjardins’ third condition – a condition that was intended to help the 
account capture the effects of history (2011, 2011b, 2016): 
 
Figure 11. Desjardins’ Path Independence 
The events, S3 and S4, both have a conditional probability of 0.5, which is conditional upon their 
respective immediately preceding events (S1 or S2). However, both S3 and S4 are said to be outcomes 
at the end of a path independent chain because their conditional probabilities fail to change as a 
result of S1 being realised or S2 being realised. In other words: 
Pr (S3|S1) = Pr (S3|S2) 
and, 
Pr (S4|S1) = Pr (S4|S2) 
This fails the third of Desjardins’ conditions for path dependence: 
(Desjardins’ Third Condition) The probabilities of the outcome changes as a function of the 
paths (or the sequence of previous events) realised31. 
Thus, according to Desjardins, S3 and S4 are not outcomes that are path dependent (and hence, are 
not evolutionarily contingent outcomes despite there being evitability). Ultimately, the realisation of 
paths did not make a difference to the probabilities of S3 or S4. To be path dependent, as per the 
third condition, history ought to make a difference to how probable the final outcomes are. 
However, even in the above path independence case, one could expect the path of ‘S0-S1-S3’ to be 
realised more often than ‘S0-S2-S3’ by a wide margin. This is because the conditional probability of S1 
is 0.8, whereas S2 is only 0.2. That is – whilst replaying the tape of life from S0 for a number of trials 
would result in equal portions of S3 and S4 (barring any sampling error), the majority of the outcomes 
                                                          
31 There is, however, a critical ambiguity in what it is that is to change as a function of previously realised 
events, which is not made clear in Desjardins’ formulation of his third condition. Importantly, Desjardins’ third 
condition is not referring to the total or unconditional probability of the outcome. In other words, it does not 
require that Pr (S3) or Pr (S4) change as a result of paths realised. It merely requires that Pr (S3|S(x)) change, 
which is to say that Pr (S3|S1) ≠ Pr (S3|S2). 
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would have resulted from S1 rather than S2. As such, if S1 or S2 were able to stamp a mark of history 
on S3 and/or S4, then the process would also be information-preserving32. 
The non-trivial objective probability account is also able to emphasise the importance of history in 
the three important respects suggested by Gould and Lewontin. As explained earlier, under the non-
trivial objective probability account, historical events probabilistically contribute to an outcome’s 
probability. In a sequence of antecedent events, the probabilities of these events determine the 
probability of an outcome. If the antecedents are of low probability, then the outcome occurring as a 
consequence of that sequence will be of low probability. But this is sufficient for the ancestral 
conditions, the ‘chanciness’ of ancestral conditions, and their ordering to matter to the outcome. 
The ancestral conditions matter to the outcome in the sense that it makes an outcome more-or-less 
probable. The different sequences of events or trajectories will have different non-total, objective 
probabilities for an outcome. That is – an outcome may be highly probable under one sequence 
consisting of a specific string of historical events and lowly probable under another sequence 
consisting of a different string of historical events. Suppose that A1 is a constituent of the former 
trajectory and, as such, helps make the former trajectory high probability whilst A2 is of the latter 
trajectory and helps make the latter trajectory low probability. It follows that the antecedents A1 and 
A2 probabilistically contributed to the outcome differently. That is – although whether A1 or A2 
occurred did not make a difference to the total objective probability of the outcome, A1 and A2 
contributed differently to the total objective probability of the outcome. Perhaps, the A1 added 0.4 
to the total objective probability of the outcome whereas A2 added only 0.02. This differs from path 
dependence in that whether A1 or A2 is realised does not affect the total objective probability. 
Secondly, it is clear that if the antecedent events have non-trivial objective probabilities, then the 
‘ancestral conditions’ are uncertain. As per Gould, history “happened to happen in a certain 
particular way” (2002; my emphasis). 
Thirdly, the effect of event ordering is built directly into sequence of probabilities. The order of 
events determines what the transition probabilities are in the sequence. Consider the below 
example, where there are two different ordered sequences and G1 and G2 refer to different 
mutational states. If G1 preceded G2, then the objective probability of O1 is 0.27. This is because, for 
whatever reason, reaching O1 from G2 is easy. However, if G2 preceded G1, then the objective 
probability of O1 is only 0.1. Event ordering (a) has a higher probability for O1 than event ordering 
(b). And, so the total objective probability of O depends on whether a system has sequences with 
event ordering (a), event ordering (b), or both. In general, the order of events affects any outcome’s 
total objective probability of evolution. 
                                                          
32 This depends on what the events S3 and S4 describe. If they are not exhaustive of system conditions, then 
they can be found with different correlates and differentiated as such. However, if all S3s are, ex hypothesi, 
identical under a system, then there can be no differentiating stamps. 
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Figure 12. Event Ordering (a) and (b) 
There is a commonality to evolutionary contingency as path dependence and evolutionary 
contingency non-trivial objective probabilities, which is that they both entail multiple possible 
outcomes. But Desjardins’ account is stronger in that it also requires that the conditional probability 
concerned changes depending on which of the immediately preceding events is realised (i.e. his 
third condition). For this reason, under Desjardins’ path dependence, history matters because they 
are difference makers to the outcome; the events that are realised make a difference to the 
probability that a given outcome occurs. However, for the non-trivial objective probability, history 
matters because antecedents play a part in determining how probable an outcome is to occur, but, 
at the same time, how probable an outcome is to occur also turns on the ordering of events. This is 
the primary difference between Desjardins’ path dependence account and the present proposal of 
evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability. 
Despite this difference, it is not clear which is superior as to render one a better account of 
evolutionary contingency. Another point of difference between the two accounts is that the non-
trivial objective probability is ‘outcome-focused’ whilst path dependence is ‘process-dependent’. 
That is – the new account makes reference to only the properties of the outcome whilst the path 
dependence account is ‘process-dependent’ because, under path dependence, whether a particular 
outcome is evolutionarily contingent depends on the properties of possible paths to outcomes. 
Lacking a reason to favour being outcome-focused over process-dependent (or vice versa), this 
presents as no means for adjudication. 
However, one way to adjudicate between the two accounts is to consider additional desiderata until 
a unique solution is reached, but this is a difficult task for, beyond the three desiderata hitherto 
presented, it is not clear what the other desiderata should be. And even if there are legitimately 
further desiderata, it may not distinguish between the two accounts if the both are equally 
satisfactory with respect to all the desiderata. For now, I leave it an open question and suggest that, 
perhaps, there is to be a sense of plurality in accounts of evolutionary contingency33.  
6. Conclusion 
Certainly, one additional desideratum might be empirical tractability (though this would seem to be 
for epistemic or practical convenience rather than theoretic reasons). The issue of empirical 
tractability has already been discussed at length with respect to the previous accounts of 
contingency (e.g. Beatty, 2006; Desjardins 2011b, 2015; Powell and Mariscal, 2015), where previous 
                                                          
33 Independent to questions about the proper characterisation of contingency, etiological structures like 
sensitivity to initial conditions or path dependence are classes of dynamics that may be true for evolutionary 
systems – certainly, their appeal within the evolutionary contingency literature has been due to their 
plausibilities. 
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proposals were satisfactory. The non-trivial objective probability account, however, is also 
empirically tractable. 
To this end, I wish to conclude the paper by discussing some of the avenues in which the non-trivial 
objective probability account of contingency can be connected to the empirical evidence. Firstly, it 
should be said that the new account does not present any methodological difficulty beyond that of 
some previous accounts (i.e. radical contingency, path dependence) since these accounts already 
require probabilities to be determined. In fact, the novel account may be easier since path 
dependence, for example, requires, at least, three conditional probabilities to be determined before 
it can be said whether one outcome is path dependent. 
On the whole, minimal welding is needed to connect evolutionary contingency as non-trivial 
objective probability with the evidence. This is because evolutionary biology is already full of tools 
and concepts that invoke probabilities. And, in some cases, the evidential connections are quite 
clear. 
Take random mutations for example. It is common for mutational studies to chart, what is called 
mutational spectra, which indicate the frequencies that certain mutational outcomes obtain from an 
initial mutational state under study. Inherent in such a spectrum are probabilities, which can be 
easily calculated from the total number of mutational trials. That is – mutational spectra contain the 
information to determine the objective probabilities that certain mutational outcomes obtain from 
the initial mutational state and, as such, allow contingency-theorists to directly determine the 
contingency of certain mutational outcomes, albeit in quite narrow modal ranges as that of singular  
phase mutational transitions. 
Laboratory experiments, including that of Blount et al.’s (2012), can also offer a means for the 
evaluation of probabilistic contingency claims. The successful origination of citT can be compared to 
the total number of evolutionary trials to calculate probabilities of its evolution. The LTEE, in 
particular, allows for an ingenious way of adjusting the modal range since there is a clear frozen 
record of all past states, ready for experimental manipulation. 
In ecological contexts, the repeated appearance of a form across evolutionary scenarios (i.e. 
convergences) or its lack thereof (i.e. idiosyncrasies; c.f. Wong, 2019) can also be informative of 
evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability. If a form is highly convergent across a 
modal range, then the probabilities of evolution are high, and the form is said to be non-contingent. 
In general, any study where probabilities of outcomes can be derived present an opportunity for the 
evaluation of evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability. Evidence, however, need 
not come from probabilities computed from frequency testing. 
Selection coefficients, which are inherently probabilistic, can also be invoked to analyse probabilistic 
contingency claims. One can, in theory, calculate a selection coefficient in a specific population and 
‘sum’ these with any other factors that might impinge (e.g. other selection coefficients, genetic drift, 
migration flow) to determine the probability of the evolution of a trait in the population over a 
specific time frame (as specified by the models) – though it is easier said than done, owing to many 
idealisations and the difficulties of accurately determining all relevant evolutionary factors. 
The proffered account of evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability presents a 
world of opportunities for empirical tractability, beyond that which I can cover here. The objective 
probability of an outcome’s evolution is but an extension of the nomologies, historicities, and so on, 
pertaining to a specific modal range. Yet, at the same time, these are the sorts of probabilities that 
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can and/or have already been determined under a variety of scenarios with conceptual tools familiar 
to biologists. 
Recently, (Beatty, 2016a, 2017) has stated that with evolutionary contingency, there should not be a 
need to rewind the tape of life and “alter” the initial conditions. One should merely rewind and play. 
This is true with the non-trivial objective probability sense. Under this account, rewinding to any 
point in the past of an evolutionarily contingent outcome, without an alteration, is (probably) 
sufficient for a different outcome to result on account of the fact that the sequence of preceding 
events was of non-trivial objective probability. The urge to avoid conflict with determinism has led to 
contingency-theorists, often, proposing etiologically heavy accounts of evolutionary contingency 
that fail, at least, one of the desiderata. But, in general, evolutionary contingency as non-trivial 
objective probability is unifying because it allows outcomes to have more or less contingency in any 
way that is relevant. It is unifying in the sense that it allows for the various proposals of continency 
to account for the non-trivial probability, if it should be the case. If an outcome is causally 
dependent on a preceding event but at the same time, that preceding event had low probability, 
then the evolutionary outcome has a non-trivial objective probability. Alternatively, an outcome can 
be sensitive to initial conditions such that there is no alternative trajectory that produces the 
outcome, but the total objective probability of evolution is going to be lower, ceteris paribus. Path 
dependence is also consistent with evolutionary contingency as low objective probability. Outcomes 
can be path dependent, but they can also have low objective probability. 
Regardless of how evolutionarily contingent outcomes are produced, it may be said that an 
outcome, O, is evolutionarily contingent in modal range, R, to the degree of objective probability, P 
(where P is between 1 and 0). 
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